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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________________ 
 
SHADUR, District Judge. 
 Compass Technology, Inc. ("Compass") appeals the district 
court judgment, following a bench trial, that accepted the 
position of defendant Tseng Laboratories, Inc. ("Tseng") in this 
contract dispute.  Compass contends that the district court erred 
(1) by admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract 
between Compass and Tseng and (2) by refusing to reopen the 
evidence after a key witness had first been located within a few 
days after the close of the 1-1/2 day bench trial. 
 Jurisdiction in the district court was invoked on diversity-
of-citizenship grounds under 28 U.S.C. §1332 (originally-named 
codefendant Wang Laboratories, Inc. ("Wang") was dismissed by the 
district court for lack of jurisdiction).  We have jurisdiction 
over this appeal from the district court's final judgment under 
28 U.S.C. §1291. 
 We hold that under any view of the evidentiary issues the 
district court erred in refusing to hear the newly-located 
witness.  And because that alone requires us to reverse the 
district court's judgment and remand for a new trial, we then 
address the related evidentiary issues as a guide to the handling 
of that second trial. 
Factual Background 
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 This dispute arises out of a "Manufacturer's Rep Agreement" 
(the "Agreement") entered into between Tseng and Compass 
effective February 19, 1988.  Under the Agreement Compass was to 
serve as the exclusive selling representative for Tseng, a 
manufacturer of computer graphics chips, in six New England 
states.  In return Compass was to receive a commission on the 
Tseng products sold by Compass within the six-state region. 
 Tseng's then Director of Sales and Marketing John Ciarlante 
("Ciarlante") prepared the form of Manufacturer's Rep Agreement 
based on his experience with a previous employer (Tseng not 
having previously used such agreements).  It took the form of a 
standard printed document, with blanks left to be filled in as 
appropriate.  While the Agreement is quite straightforward in 
most respects, its Paragraphs 3 and 4 give rise to the present 
controversy: 
3. PRODUCTS -- The Representative shall sell the 
"products" of the manufacturer set forth herein which 
may be changed by the Manufacturer upon sixty (60) days 





4. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION -- Representative's 
compensation for services performed hereunder shall be 
5%2 of the "net invoice price" defined herein below, of 
the Manufacturer's product for which an order is taken 
by Representative.  However, when engineering, 
execution of the order, or shipment involve different 
territories the Manufacturer will split the full 
commission among the Representatives whose territories 
are involved.  The Manufacturer will make this 
determination and advise the interested Representatives 
at the time the order is submitted to the Manufacturer. 
                     






 No Addendum #1 is in the record, and that has proved to be 
the focal point of the dispute between the parties.  Even though 
Tseng was unable to produce a copy of any such addendum or to 
provide any witness who could testify to its claimed contents or 
could even recall seeing one, it nonetheless says that there was 
such an animal and that the addendum specified that Compass was 
to receive no commission whatever on any sales of Tseng products 
to Wang.  For its part, Compass claims that no Addendum #1 ever 
existed and that the Agreement is clear that Compass was to 
receive a 5% commission on all sales within its territory, 
including sales to Wang.  What is at stake, if Compass is indeed 
entitled to such a commission on sales to Wang during the time 
that the Agreement was in effect, is an amount close to $200,000 
exclusive of prejudgment interest. 
 Like most such catch phrases, the Chinese proverb that "One 
picture is worth ten thousand words" is obviously not intended to 
be taken literally as a universal rule.  In this instance, 
however, the relevant picture is of the words themselves--the 
Agreement's pages showing its standardized form, the placement of 
the blanks and the filling in of the blanks (or perhaps more 
importantly, the failure to fill in the blanks)--and that picture 
is worth a good many words in the context of this case.  We have 
therefore annexed a photocopy of the Agreement's most relevant 
and most illustrative page, its page 1. 
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 Ciarlante had been Tseng's sole participant in negotiating 
and signing the Agreement on its behalf, while Compass was 
represented by its President Donald Rheault ("Rheault").  At 
trial Rheault testified that he could not recall whether or not 
there was an Addendum #1 attached to the Agreement when he signed 
it.  Because Ciarlante could not be located by either party 
before the trial, Tseng's only witness who spoke to the issue at 
all was John Gibbons, a founder, director and business consultant 
for Tseng, who testified that he had instructed Ciarlante to 
exclude sales to Wang from the Agreement.  But Gibbons admitted 
on cross-examination that he did not actually see the Agreement 
until March 1989--more than a year after it was executed and 
delivered--and that he has never seen any Addendum #1. 
 Early in the trial the district court determined as a matter 
of law that the Agreement's reference to the missing Addendum #1 
created an ambiguity (1994 WL 446853, at *1).  Over Compass' 
objections the district court then allowed testimony about the 
parties' intent as to what commission was to be paid on sales to 
Wang. 
 Although the district court's comments during the short 
bench trial had reflected a healthy skepticism as to whether 
there had ever been an Addendum #1 (let alone what its terms were 
if it actually existed), the court ultimately reached the 
following conclusion (id. at *2): 
On the basis of the credible evidence presented by the 
parties the Court finds that Addendum #1 provided that 
Compass would receive no commission on the sale of 
Tseng Products to house accounts and that, at the time 
the Agreement was executed, Tseng's only house account 
6 
was Wang.  Compass knew and was aware that no 
commission was to be paid on house accounts and that 
Wang was Tseng's most substantial account and its only 
house account.   Compass knew and was aware of the fact 
that a commission would not be paid on the Wang 
account. 
 
That holding was based, according to the district court, on three 
strands of evidence presented at trial (id. at *2-3): 
 1. In addition to the stated awareness on Compass' part 
reflected in the last two quoted sentences, Compass was 
also aware that Tseng's previous manufacturer's 
representative had been dismissed for requesting 
commissions on the Wang account.3 
 2. Compass received two small commission statements for 
periods during which substantial sales were made to 
Wang, yet did not question Tseng or complain when those 
statements did not cover those sales to Wang. 
 3. In November 1988 (six months after the contract became 
effective) representatives of Compass and Tseng met to 
discuss a commission for servicing the Wang account and 
agreed that Compass would receive a 1% commission on 
sales to Wang after December 1, 1988. 
Based on those findings the district court included in the total 
damages it awarded to Compass only 1% of the sales to Wang 
                     
3Our examination of the record has disclosed no evidence whatever 
to support this finding.  As for the other findings by the 
district court, both those quoted above and those summarized in 
the text of this opinion, we make no effort to review either the 
evidence tendered by Tseng or Compass' submission of point-by-
point evidence to the contrary, matters that we anticipate will 
be re-evaluated by the district court in light of the Ciarlante 
testimony and of what is said in this opinion. 
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between December 1, 1988 and May 24, 1989 (that figure came to 
$18,402) plus prejudgment interest (id. at *3).4 
 On August 16, 1994--after the trial had ended on August 11 
but before the judge's August 15 decision was docketed and sent 
to the parties on August 18--Compass' efforts to locate 
Ciarlante, launched some months earlier, bore fruit.  Its counsel 
immediately filed a Motion To Stay Issuance of Decision, or 
Vacate Decision, and Re-Open Evidence to Permit the Testimony of 
Previously Missing Witness.5  Then on August 22, after it had 
received the district court's decision, Compass filed a second 
motion--its Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment, or, Alternatively 
for New Trial, or Re-Opening of the Evidence--under Fed.R.Civ.P 
("Rule") 59(a).  Compass then supported that motion with an 
affidavit from Ciarlante in which he stated what his testimony, 
if it were credited at all, would be if the Court reopened the 
evidence and allowed him to testify. 
 Suffice it to say at this point that Ciarlante's testimony, 
if it were credited at all, would have been devastating to 
Tseng's position.  Among other sworn assertions that supported 
Compass' position in its entirety, Ciarlante flatly controverted 
Gibbons' testimony as to any discussions having taken place about 
Wang sales being noncommissionable (or being commissionable at a 
                     
4As reflected in the text, December 1, 1988 was the date on which 
the district court found that Tseng agreed to begin paying 
Compass a 1% commission on Wang sales.  As for the May 24, 1989 
date, that came from the fact that Tseng notified Compass of the 
Agreement's termination on April 24, 1989, and Agreement ¶9 
called for any such termination to be effective 30 days later.   
5Because of a mix-up in filing, that motion was not docketed 
until September 12, 1994. 
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reduced rate) and just as flatly negated the existence of the 
mysterious Addendum #1: 
29. It was in this context that the manufacturers 
representative agreement with Compass Technology, Inc., 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C, was 
entered into in February of 1989. 
 
30. I prepared that contract and I dealt exclusively 
with Mr. Rheault in connection with its execution. 
 
31. There was never an Addendum #1 attached to the 
contract, nor was it ever intended that there would be 
an Addendum #1 attached to the contract. 
 
32. It was never the intent on the part of either 
Tseng or Compass that commissions on sales to Wang 
would be excluded from the contract or would be treated 
as subject to a reduced commission. 
 
33. One of Compass' responsibilities was to salvage 
the Wang account and develop the Wang business.  Under 
those circumstances, it would have made no sense for 
Tseng to require that there be no commission paid on 
Wang sales through Compass Technology, Inc. or that 
there be a reduction of any commission earned on those 
sales. 
 
34. There were never any discussions within Tseng 
Laboratories, Inc. that there would be no commissions 
paid to Compass with respect to Wang sales and I was 
not instructed to include such a provision, or a 
provision calling for reduced commissions, in any 
contract, addendum or other arrangement entered into 
with Compass Technology, Inc. on behalf of Wang. 
 
35. I was never told that any manufacturers rep 
agreement I entered into on behalf of Tseng would have 
to be approved, initialed or countersigned by anyone, 
including John Gibbons or Jack Tseng. 
 
36. The form of agreement used in connection with the 
Compass Technology, Inc. contract was one I used while 
employed at Princeton Graphics and that form of 
agreement provided for an Addendum #1, which was 
occasionally used by Princeton Graphics to exclude 
certain products, not to list house accounts. 
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37. I have never seen an Addendum #1 in connection 
with the Compass agreement or any other manufacturers 
rep agreement entered into during my tenure at Tseng. 
 38.  I was present at the breakfast meeting which took place 
on November 2, 1988 at which John Gibbons and Donald Rheault 
were present. 
 
39.  I did not meet with Donald Rheault the night before 
that meeting to advise him that Compass Technology, Inc. 
would now be receiving a 1% commission on Wang sales, and I 
was not instructed by anyone at Tseng to have any such 
conversation with Mr. Rheault. 
 
40.  Had such an instruction been given to me, I would 
remember it, because it would have been directly contrary to 
the arrangement which Tseng had with Compass Technology, 
Inc. for the payment of a 5% commission on sales in Compass' 
New England territory, and it would have represented a 
drastic change in what had been agreed upon, namely, that 
Compass would receive a full commission on all sales in its 
territory. 
 
41.  There was no conversation at the breakfast meeting on 
November 2 in which Donald Rheault thanked John Gibbons for 
allowing Compass Technology, Inc. a 1% commission.  Again, I 
would have a definite recollection of any such comment 
because it would have been inconsistent with what I knew to 
be the arrangement between Compass Technology, Inc. and 
Tseng, namely, that Compass was to receive a 5% commission 
on all sales in its territory, including sales to Wang.  The 
breakfast meeting was to discuss protocol and the agenda of 
a meeting scheduled to take place at Wang immediately 
following breakfast. 
 
 On December 20, 1994 the district court denied both of 
Compass' motions, finding that Ciarlante could have been located 
earlier had Compass exercised "reasonable diligence," that 
Ciarlante's testimony about Addendum #1 would be "merely 
cumulative" and that at any rate his testimony would not change 
the outcome (1994 WL 719616).  That decision tied up the last 
loose ends before the district court and set the stage for this 
appeal. 
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Refusal To Reopen Judgment 
 We begin where the factual account has just ended--with the 
district court's rejection of Compass' motion, brought under this 
portion of Rule 59(a): 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues . . . in an action 
tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which 
rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in 
equity in the courts of the United States. 
 
Although that provision does not in terms speak of such relief 
being based on new evidence, Rule 60(b)(2) provides that "newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial" can give rise to 
relief from a judgment or order.  Rule 59 and Rule 60(b)(2) share 
the same standard for granting relief on the basis of newly 
discovered evidence (11 Charles Wright, Arthur Miller and Mary 
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil 2d § 2808, at 86 
(2d ed. 1995). 
 That standard requires that the new evidence (1) be material 
and not merely cumulative, (2) could not have been discovered 
before trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence and (3) 
would probably have changed the outcome of the trial (Bohus v. 
Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991)).  Any party requesting 
such relief "bears a heavy burden" (id., quoting Pilsco v. Union 
R. Co., 379 F.2d 15, 17 (3d Cir. 1967)).  Though we consequently 
review a district court's decision in that respect for an abuse 
of discretion (cf. Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem Corp., 
9 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 1993), dealing with the other side of 
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the coin--the erroneous admission of evidence), in this instance 
we hold that the district court did indeed abuse its discretion 
by refusing to reopen the evidence to allow Ciarlante to testify. 
 First, the district court held that Compass could have 
located Ciarlante had it exercised "reasonable diligence."  But 
that determination gives insufficient credence to the affidavit 
of Compass' counsel F. Anthony Mooney ("Mooney") that accompanied 
its motion.  Mooney there chronicled Compass' continuing efforts 
to locate Ciarlante, which began as soon as Mooney learned 
through discovery in the case about the vital position of 
Ciarlante as Tseng's only participant in the negotiations with 
Compass that resulted in the Agreement (as well as Ciarlante's 
having been Tseng's signatory to the Agreement). 
 Indeed, it is plain that both sides were searching for 
Ciarlante as a possible witness:  When Tseng's counsel was asked 
by the district court about his whereabouts, she replied, "Heaven 
only knows.  Neither party has found him."  Based on Compass' 
counsel's pursuit of several possible avenues to trace 
Ciarlante's whereabouts, on counsel's ultimate success in 
locating him through the lawyer who represented Ciarlante in his 
lawsuit against Tseng (with whom Ciarlante had a falling out), 
and on counsel's immediate request to the district court to 
reopen proofs (before counsel knew that the judge had issued his 
written ruling a day earlier), it must be concluded that Compass 
made the appropriate showing of diligence.6 
                     
6One matter that the district judge mentioned in ruling otherwise 
was that Compass had twice (on July 27 and August 5, 1994) 
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 More critically for Rule 59 purposes, the district court's 
characterization of Ciarlante's proposed testimony as "merely 
cumulative" is unacceptable.  That surprising label was ascribed 
to Ciarlante's affidavit because Rheault had testified that there 
was no Addendum #1 that excluded products sold to Wang.  But it 
is plainly different in both degree and kind to have such 
testimony emanating from the sole representative of Tseng in the 
negotiation and signing of the Agreement.  Moreover, Ciarlante's 
affidavit expressly contradicts the testimony of Tseng's witness 
(Gibbons), who had said that such an exclusion of Wang sales had 
been intended, and other previously-quoted portions of the 
affidavit (its Paragraphs 38-41) are also wholly at odds with 
Gibbons' testimony as to the asserted post-contract negotiation 
of a lower commission rate on Wang sales. 
 We do not of course rule on which witness or witnesses are 
ultimately to be credited--that is a matter for the district 
court to decide on remand.  But the point at this stage of the 
proceedings is that if Ciarlante's testimony were to be believed 
in any material respect, it could not fairly be viewed as "merely 
cumulative."  One thing should be added in that regard, 
occasioned by the district court's comment (just after another 
use of the term "merely cumulative") that Tseng would challenge 
Ciarlante's credibility because he had been terminated by Tseng 
                                                                  
opposed Tseng's requests to continue the trial date because 
Tseng's key witness was scheduled to be out of the country. 
Whatever else might be said on that score, of course it would be 
inappropriate to turn down Compass' motion as some sort of 
penalty for its not having consented to Tseng's request for a 
continuance. 
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and had later sued it for wrongful discharge.  Just as this court 
does not make credibility determinations as to witnesses whom we 
have not seen and heard (else we might review district court 
credibility findings de novo, rather than according them the 
respect that we do), so it would be improper for the district 
court to consider discrediting Ciarlante sight unseen. 
 Lastly in Rule 59(a) terms, the district court ruled that 
Ciarlante's testimony would not change the outcome of the trial. 
But that is closely linked to the point we have just made.  At a 
minimum such a determination cannot be made without the prior--
and impermissible--determination that Ciarlante would be 
disbelieved without ever seeing and hearing him testify.  Indeed, 
even on that premise it cannot safely be said that the prior 
trial outcome should stand in any event--and that is so for other 
reasons to be discussed in the next section. 
 Our conclusion is additionally fortified by the posture of 
the case before the district court.  What we have said would call 
for the granting even of a conventional Rule 59(a) (or Rule 
60(b)(2)) motion for a new trial.  But that result obtains a 
fortiori where what had taken place here was a short bench trial, 
with the district court facing only the need to reassemble 
counsel (and their clients, if they desired) to hear Ciarlante 
out through direct and cross-examination, and with no need to 
recall the other witnesses to testify anew (except perhaps to 
amplify their testimony in light of Ciarlante's)--let alone any 
need to reconvene with a new jury for a full-blown rerun, as a 
new trial most often requires. 
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 In sum, a new trial must be ordered because of the district 
court's erroneous ruling on Compass' Rule 59(a) motion.  That 
conclusion logically leads to a brief discussion of some of the 
evidentiary ground rules for that new trial, as called into 
question by this appeal. 
Evidence and Burden of Proof 
 Both before the district court and before us, the litigants 
have focused their principal fire on issues of parol evidence: 
whether under Pennsylvania law (which is specified by Agreement 
¶12 to provide the rules of decision, a designation that both 
parties to this diversity-of-citizenship action have honored) it 
is proper to resort to matters outside of the Agreement itself 
that assertedly bear on the intent of the contracting parties. 
Analysis demonstrates that another aspect of Pennsylvania law 
calls for those issues to be scrutinized in conjunction with 
considering what constitutes the appropriate level of proof on 
the evidentiary issues. 
 It is of course familiar and noncontroversial doctrine that 
the fundamental object in interpreting a contract is to ascertain 
the intent of the parties (Z&L Lumber Co. of Atlasburg v. 
Nordquist, 348 Pa. Super. 580, 585, 502 A.2d 697, 699 (1985). And 
if their intent can be cleanly extracted from the clear and 
unambiguous words that the parties have used, it is equally 
conventional wisdom that they are held to those words contained 
in the contract (Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 
F.2d 1001, 1013 (3d Cir. 1980)).  Those clear waters become 
murkier when an issue is raised as to a lack of clarity or a 
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claimed ambiguity in the contractual language--in that event the 
court "should hear the evidence presented by both parties and 
then decide whether `there is objective indicia that, from the 
linguistic reference point of the parties, the terms of the 
contract are susceptible of different meanings'" (Z&L Lumber, 348 
Pa. Super. at 586, 502 A.D. at 700, quoting Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d 
at 1011).  In doing so the court must consider the words of the 
contract, the alternative meaning proffered by the challenging 
party, and the nature of the evidence that party could provide 
(Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011).  It is up to the party claiming 
that an ambiguity exists to show that a contract (Metzger v. 
Clifford Realty Corp., 327 Pa. Super. 377, 388, 476 A.2d 1 
(1984): 
is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different 
constructions and is capable of being understood in 
more senses than one and is obscure in meaning through 
indefiniteness of expression or has a double meaning. 
 
 In this instance, Agreement ¶11 contains the conventional 
integration clause prohibiting resort to other discussions and 
agreements between the parties: 
GENERAL -- This Agreement contains the entire 
understanding of the parties, shall supersede any other 
oral or written agreements, and shall be binding upon 
and inure to the benefit of the parties' successors and 
assigns.  It may not be modified in any way without the 
written consent of both parties. 
 
Nonetheless the Agreement itself poses an obvious question on its 
face:  Does the reference in Paragraph 3 of the standard form 
Agreement to "Addendum #1, attached hereto" match up with an 
actual document, or is it simply a part of that standard form 
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that has no real significance (in somewhat the same way that, for 
example, a printed standard form of real estate contract may 
often contain a boilerplate reference "See also rider(s) 
attached" whether or not a particular contract has any riders at 
all)?  And that basic question subsumes a whole set of such 
subsidiary questions as: 
 Is it likely that if an Addendum #1--containing a special 
 provision as to Tseng's single largest account 
(Wang)--had in fact existed and had been 
"attached," neither contracting party would have 
anywhere in its possession any Agreement other than 
the version that was wholly lacking in any Addendum 
#1 or any other attachment? 
 Is it likely that if an Addendum #1 had in fact existed, it 
 would have contained a provision dealing, not 
with some exception to Tseng's "products" that were 
to be sold by Compass ("products" are, after all, 
the subject to which the reference to any such 
addendum in Agreement ¶3 relates), but rather with 
a claimed exception to the totality of Tseng's 
customers to whom commissionable sales were to be 
made? 
 In the same respect, is it likely that if an Addendum #1 had 
 in fact existed, no further explanatory 
reference to the subject matter of that addendum 
would have been inserted in the space following the 
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colon in Agreement #3, rather than the parties 
having left that space totally blank? 
 As a variant on those last two questions, is it likely 
 that if an Addendum #1 had in fact existed, and 
had dealt with an exception to the flat 5% 
commission rate prescribed in Agreement ¶4, no 
exception to that rate (or at least no cross-
reference to Addendum #1) would have been referred 
to in the Agreement's blank space that immediately 
followed that printed Agreement ¶4? 
 There may be other questions that bear on the issue, and we 
do not suggest the answers to any of them (again that is 
something for the trier of fact)--but clearly all of those 
matters call for the district court to do more than to limit 
itself in terms of the sometime arcane questions of what 
separates "patent" from "latent" ambiguities (see Metzger, 327 
Penn. Super. at 386, 476 A.2d at 5) or of what constitutes an 
"internal" as contrasted with an "external" ambiguity.  Certainly 
the potential tyranny of such labels made it appropriate for the 
district court to have considered the testimony of Gibbons as to 
the alleged content of a meeting between the parties that took 
place well after the Agreement was entered into.  And with that 
testimony before the trier of fact, it was just as plainly 
necessary for the district court to consider the testimony of 
Ciarlante that directly challenged Gibbons' statement as to the 
holding of any meeting having the content to which Gibbons 
testified. 
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 But to return to the point of beginning, the central focus 
of the parties' dispute is clearly on the question whether or not 
Addendum #1 truly existed--a question that bears not only on the 
meaning of the Agreement to begin with but also on whether the 
testimony of Gibbons or Ciarlante as to the claimed post-
Agreement negotiation is to be credited.  Because Tseng bears the 
burden of proving the existence of an ambiguity (under Metzger 
and like cases), and because it hangs its ambiguity argument on 
an addendum that the parties do not agree even exists and that 
Tseng cannot produce, this case bears a substantial resemblance 
to the "lost instrument" issue that arises from time to time in 
contract cases.  And in that context the Pennsylvania courts have 
imposed a stringent standard of proof on the party that seeks to 
rely on a document that it cannot produce. 
 Thus the plaintiff in Hacker v. Price, 166 Pa. Super. 404, 
407, 71 A.2d 851, 853 (1950) claimed that a written agreement 
gave him the right to purchase three shares of stock.  Although 
the original Agreement was lost, plaintiff was allowed to 
introduce secondary evidence to show the content of the agreement 
and was ultimately successful in forcing specific performance. In 
affirming that decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court set out 
the following requirements for recovering on a lost instrument 
(id., citations omitted): 
To recover on an instrument, the original of which has 
been lost, the burden of proving the loss of the 
original and that a diligent, bona fide and thorough 
search was made without success is upon the one 
offering secondary evidence.  He is also required to 
prove its former existence, execution, delivery and 
contents.  The evidence to sustain these averments must 
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be clear and convincing.  Whether the party offering 
secondary evidence has met this burden of proof 
successfully is a matter to be determined by the trial 
Court and rests largely in the Court's discretion which 
will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a 
manifest abuse thereof. 
That "clear and convincing evidence" requirement echoes 
established Pennsylvania doctrine.  See, e.g., Mahoney v. 
Collman, 293 Pa. 478, 482, 143 A. 186, 187 (1928) (imposing a 
"very heavy burden" on the party seeking to rely on a lost 
instrument, as well as announcing the "clear and convincing" 
evidentiary standard); In re Greggerson's Estate 344 Pa. Super. 
498, 500-01, 25 A.2d 711, 713 (1942) (following Mahoney). 
 We recognize of course that those Pennsylvania cases have 
dealt with the "lost instrument" approach in a somewhat different 
context, applying it to plaintiffs who attempt to recover on such 
a missing document, rather than to a defendant who needs to prove 
such a document to satisfy its burden of establishing an 
ambiguity (in that respect only Haagen v. Patton, 193 Pa. Super. 
186, 190, 164 A.2d 33, 34-35 (1960) is factually parallel to this 
case, and that opinion had no occasion to discuss the required 
standard of proof).  Accordingly we do not opine on the level of 
proof to be applied by the district court on remand.  Instead we 
leave it to that court to determine in the first instance whether 
the same considerations that have called for the higher "clear 
and convincing" standard of proof in the Pennsylvania "lost 
document" cases apply with like force to the situation involved 
in this case. 
Conclusion 
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 On remand, then, the district court is required to hear and 
consider the testimony of Ciarlante as to all of the matters 
dealt with in his affidavit.  And in the district court's 
reconsideration of all of the evidence in light of that 
testimony, it should give consideration to whether Tseng's burden 
of proving: 
 1.  that Addendum #1 existed; 
 2.  that the claimed addendum could not be found after 
a bona fide search; and 
 3.  that Addendum #1 excluded sales to Wang from the 
across-the-board 5% commission provision set out in 
Agreement ¶4; 
should be scrutinized through a more demanding "clear and 
convincing evidence" lens.  We reverse and remand the case for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
---------------- 
 
